

FEBRUARY 2021 WINTER STORM EVENT

DENNIS GRENNAN NEBRASKA POWER REVIEW BOARD SPP REGIONAL STATE COMMITTEE

> Helping our members work together to keep the lights on... today and in the future.





SouthwestPowerPool (in) southwest-power-pool

SPPora

AGENDA

- Introduction
- Southwest Power Pool Overview
- February Weather Events
- Causes and Lessons Learned
- Questions

WHO IS SPP?

501(c)(6) nonprofit corporation

One of 9 regional grid operators

104 member companies in 14 states

"Air traffic control" for high-voltage grid

Balances supply and demand across region


Maintains reliable grid operations

Operates wholesale energy market


Plans future transmission needs



AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: AN ANALOGY



THREE ELECTRIC INTERCONNECTIONS



1,270 MW potential transfer capability from Western to Eastern Interconnection

800 MW potential transfer capability between SPP and ERCOT


SPP's Reliability Objectives

1: Energy supplied to grid must equal energy demands


2: Transmission system must be operated within safe, reliable limits



ΞΞΞ







Neighborhood transformer Transformer Transmission lines Distribution Transformers on Power plant poles step down electricity before steps up voltage for carry electricity long lines carry generates electricity distances steps down electricity to it enters houses voltage transmission homes and businesses

FERC AND NERC JURISDICTIONAL

NERC

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION



SPP and utilities must comply with mandatory, enforceable NERC standards

Government enacted reliability standards after 2003 blackout


NERC regularly audits SPP

NERC directs how much energy SPP must keep for emergencies

FERC approves NERC standards

SPP must comply with FERC directives


NAMEPLATE CAPACITY* 94,648 MW



Natural Gas (38.9%)
Coal (24.3%)
■ Nuclear (2.2%)
Solar (0.2%)


Wind (29%)
Hydro (3.6%)
Fuel Oil (1.7%)
Other (0.1%)





Solar (0.3%)

2020 ENERGY PRODUCTION 262.730 TWH




* As of 1/13/21

⁺As of 6/15/20

Other (0.5%)

MINIMUM & MAXIMUM PERCENT OF GENERATION BY FUEL TYPE*



Jan. to Dec. 31, 2020

THE BIG PICTURE

Early prep helped

2/4: Issued cold weather alert

2/8: Issued resource alert

2/11: Committed long-lead generation



Demand dropped below forecast, helping minimize interruptions



We used every MW we could get

We ran every available generator and imported energy from neighbors Service interruptions required

GRID

2/15 ~ 1.5% of system demand - 57 min.

2/16 Up to ~6.5% of system demand 3 hr. 23 min.



Collaboration reduced impact

> Controlled, temporary interruptions prevented uncontrolled blackouts


SPP REGION IN COLDEST PART OF U.S.

SPP Southwest Power Pool

Lowest temperatures forecast for Feb. 14-16, 2021

Sources: National Weather Service, Global Forecast System

- SPP service territory/ balancing authority
- Temperatures below 0°F
- Between 0° and 32°F
- Above 32°F



* Locations of ISOs/RTOs are approximate

BALANCING AUTHORITY (BA) ALERT LEVELS

Alert levels defined by SPP operating plans

Normal Operations	SPP has enough generation to meet demand, has available reserves and does not foresee extreme or abnormal reliability threats
Weather alert	SPP expects extreme weather in its reliability coordination service territory
Resource alert	SPP's BA area expects severe weather conditions, significant outages, wind- forecast uncertainty and/or load- forecast uncertainty with potential to impact total capacity.
Conservative Operations	SPP determines the need to operate system conservatively to avoid an emergency based on weather, environmental, operational, terrorist, cyber or other events
Maximum emergency generation notification	SPP foresees the need to use emergency ranges of resources for a certain hours.

Alert levels defined^{*} by NERC EOP-011-1

Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Level 1	 All available generation resources in use All generation is committed, and there is concern about maintaining required reserves for BA Non-firm wholesale energy sales curtailed.
EEA Level 2	 Load management procedures in effect BA is no longer able to provide its expected energy requirements and is energy deficient Operating plan implemented, including public appeals and demand response BA is still able to maintain minimum reserves Market participants and other BAs notified Transmission limitations evaluated and revised BA makes use of all available resources
EEA Level 3	 Firm load interruption imminent or in progress BA is unable to meet minimum contingency reserve requirements System & reliability limits revaluated and revised Immediate action taken to mitigate undue risk to the Interconnection, including load shedding.

* These are paraphrased, summarized definitions. Full definitions: https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Reliability%20Standards/EOP-011-1.pdf

SPP BALANCING AUTHORITY OPERATIONS: FEB. 4-20, 2021

Time blocks are not to scale

Thurs. 2/4 to Mon. 2/8	Tues 2/9 to Sat. 2/13	Sun. 2/14	Mon. 2/15	Tues. 2/16	Wed. 2/17	Thurs. 2/18	Fri. 2/19	Sat. 2/20							
Normal operations in effect			Conservative operations in effect	EEA2 in effect		EEA1	EEA1								
Thurs. 2/4: Issued cold weather alert to grid	Tues. 2/9: Declared	As Requested member companies issue public appeals for conservation Declared EEA3 New record pear 12:04 - Firm loa interruption 12:04 - Firm loa interruption 13:01 - EEA3 New record pear 14:00	05:00 Declared EEA1	06:15 Declared EEA3		in effect	in effect								
operators	conservative operations until further notice		member companies issue public appeals for conservation Declared EEA1 to be effective	07:22 Declared EEA2	06:44 Firm load	EEA 2 in effect									
	Thurs. 2/11: Committed			rs. 2/11: Committed onger-lead time nerating resources for Sat. 2/13 to Tues. 2/16 Declared EEA1 to be effective	companies issue public appeals for conservation	companies issue public appeals for	companies issue public appeals for	companies issue public appeals for	companies	S 10.00	interruption				Conservative
	longer-lead time								Declared EEA3 New record peak	10:07 – EEA3		09:30 Ended EEA and		operations in effect	
	for Sat. 2/13						12:04 - Firm load interruption	11:30 Declared EEA2		remained in conservative	09:20 Ended EEA and remained in				
	Sat. 2/13: Reminded EEA					13:01 - EEA3			operations through 22:00 Sat. 2/20, with	conservative operations					
Mon. 2/8: Issued resource alert to grid operators: "Implement resource	market participants of emergency cap & offer processes				14:00	12:31 Declared EEA1	13:15 Declared EEA1	appeal for public conservation	through 22:00 Sat. 2/20, with appeal for public conservation						
preparationsensure resource commitment start-up and run times report fuel shortages & transmission outages"			Declared EEA2	18:28 Declared EEA2	18:20 Declared EEA2 22:59 Declared EEA1	18:25 – Declared EEA1		22:00 Declared normal operations							

DRIVERS OF TEMPORARY SERVICE INTERRUPTIONS

. Generation unavailability


- Lack of fuel supply
- Icing and extreme cold weather-related outages


2. Rapid reduction of energy imports

- Transmission congestion related
- Tightening supply conditions in neighboring areas
- 3. Record wintertime energy consumption

AVAILABLE GENERATION IN SPP MARKET








Up to 35,000 MW of generating capacity unavailable to meet demand, nearly 2.5x more outages than first week of Feb.

Energy Emergency Alerts in Effect 40,000 Outaged/Derated MW Capacity 30,000 20,000 10,000 -02/02/21 00:00 02/08/21 00:00 02/14/21 00:00 02/20/21 00:00 02/05/21 00:00 02/11/21 00:00 02/17/21 00:00

TOTAL GENERATION OUTAGES


02/23/21 00:00



2/15 LOAD & ONLINE GENERATION WITH NET ENERGY IMPORTS

SPP issued EEA3 when unable to maintain required reservesReduced imports created supply vs. demand imbalance


Online Generation & Scheduled — BA Load — BA Load & Contingency Reserves Interchange



2/15 NET ENERGY IMPORTS

----- Net Energy Imports


At times, SPP was importing significant amounts of energy



2/16 NET ENERGY IMPORTS


Net Energy Imports

At times, SPP was importing significant amounts of energy, although less than what had been available day prior



ENERGY THAT MET DEMAND IN REAL-TIME MARKET

SPP relied on energy from multiple sources, including imports from neighbors




INTERRUPTIONS BY ENTITY


Participating Entity	% of MW
CSWS	16.8
WAPA	13.5
SPS	12.4
OKGE	12.4
KCPL	9.68
WR	8.49
NPPD	6.57
OPPD	4.6
WFEC	3.78
GRDA	2.22
SECI	2.22
EDE	2.19
LES	1.36
SPRM	1.22
KACY_N	0.92
CBPC	0.83
INDN	0.38
SPA	0.28
TSGT	0.13
SPP Total	100%

Winter percentages effective 12/1 through 2/28


Directed interruptions allocated to transmission operators on pro-rata basis




AVERAGE SUPPLY MIX FEBRUARY 14 DAILY AVERAGE



AVERAGE SUPPLY MIX FEBRUARY 15 CONTROLLED OUTAGE TIMEFRAME




AVERAGE SUPPLY MIX FEBRUARY 16 CONTROLLED OUTAGE TIMEFRAME






AVERAGE SUPPLY MIX FEBRUARY 17 DAILY AVERAGE




GENERATING CAPACITY IN SPP – WIND

2/15 EEA3 2/16 EEA3




Wind generation during EEA3 periods constituted ~12-16% of nameplate capacity & ~90-115% of accredited capacity, with ~43-54% of that provided by accredited resources

GENERATING CAPACITY IN SPP – COAL



Coal generation during EEA3 periods constituted ~77-79% of nameplate capacity and ~80-82% of accredited capacity, with ~98% of that provided by accredited resources

GENERATING CAPACITY IN SPP – GAS



Gas generation during EEA3 periods constituted ~34-37% of nameplate capacity & ~42-48% of accredited capacity, with ~95% of that provided by accredited resources











1. UNAVAILABLE GENERATION AND FUEL

Lack of available generation was the primary cause of the event's reliability impacts.

Lack of fuel was the biggest cause of generation unavailability.



2. HIGH GAS PRICES

Extremely high natural gas prices were the primary driver of recordhigh energy offers, exceeding SPP's market offer caps for the first time.

3. INCREASED CREDIT EXPOSURE

Rapid spike in SPP's market prices raised concerns about market participants' liquidity & exponentially increased short-term credit exposure.



4. HELPFUL INTERCONNECTIONS

Relationships & interconnections with neighboring systems facilitated critical helpful assistance.



5. CONGESTED TRANSMISSION

Full use of generation in certain locations was limited by congestion on SPP's system.



6. MINIMIZED RELIABILITY IMPACTS

Early preparation, timely decisions & effective communication helped minimize reliability impacts while effective execution of load-shed procedures mitigated the risk of uncontrolled blackouts.



7. CREDIBLE COMMUNICATIONS & RESPONSE

Stakeholders indicated general satisfaction with SPP's emergency communications, information sharing & credibility, while recognizing the need for improvements.

PRIORITIZATION LEVELS

TIER 1	Necessary and urgent to avoid severe reliability, financial, operational, compliance or reputational risks. Address system-related root causes of the 2021 winter event or mitigate occurrence of future extreme system event impacts.				
TIER 2	Necessary to minimize the risk of severe reliability, financial, operational, compliance or reputational consequences associated with extreme system events. Important and expected to significantly improve SPP's response to extreme system events in the future.				
TIER 3	Improve SPP's response, communications and public perception during extreme system events, but are not necessary or urgent.				

RECOMMENDATION TYPES



Action: Development and/or implementation of a new process, requirement, protocol or other activity.

Policy: Development of principles to be used to guide subsequent development of requirements, protocols, and/or processes using the stakeholder process in accordance with bylaws, tariff provisions and applicable regulations.



Assessment: Performance of analysis that informs development of solutions through the stakeholder process.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

	Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
Fuel Assurance (FA)	※省	省	
Resource Planning & Availability (RPA)	**		
Emergency Response Process & Planning (ERP)		*	
Operator Tools, Communication and Processes (OTCP)		=3*	
Seams Agreements (SEAMS)		=3*	
Market Design (MKT)		°a°a **	
Transmission Planning (TXP)		2	a
Credit (CR)		**	🔆 🎲
Communications (COMM)		* *	<i>≣?</i> \$ ₹?\$
22 TOTAL	4	13	5

FUEL ASSURANCE

#	TIER	ΤΥΡΕ	DRIVER	RECOMMENDATION
FA 1	TIER 1			Develop policies that enhance fuel assurance to improve generation availability & reliability in SPP region
FA 2	TIER 1	-2-		Evaluate and, as applicable, advocate for improvements in gas industry policies, including use of gas price cap mechanisms, needed to assure gas supply is readily & affordably available during extreme events
FA 3	TIER 2			Develop policies to improve gas-electric coordination that better inform & enable improved emergency response



RESOURCE PLANNING & AVAILABILITY

#	TIER	ТҮРЕ	DRIVER	RECOMMENDATION
RPA 1	TIER 1	-0		Perform initial & ongoing assessments of minimum reliability attributes needed from SPP's resource mix
RPA 2	TIER 1			 Improve or develop policies that ensure sufficient resources will be available during normal & extreme conditions. May include: Required performance of seasonal resource adequacy assessments Developing accreditation criteria Incorporating minimum reliability attribute requirements Utilizing market-based incentives

SPP'S BOARD TOOK THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS

- 1. Accepted SPP's report: "A Comprehensive Review of Southwest Power Pool's response to the February 2021 Winter Storm"
- 2. Directed work to begin on immediately on recommendations that address root causes (Tier 1)
- 3. Directed organizational prioritization of work needed to address remaining recommendations
- 4. Directed staff to provide quarterly updates on status of progress being made
- 5. Directed staff to submit for board approval in October a project plan of activities needed to resolve the Tier 1 recommendations
- 6. Directed issuance of letters to all generator operators in the SPP region requiring them to inform SPP about their plans to have and maintain fuel necessary to assure availability of all generation treated as accredited capacity for the upcoming winter season
- 7. Directed staff to perform additional root cause analyses to explain the failure of natural gas fuel supply during the weather event needed to better inform SPP's three fuel assurance recommendations



AFTER THE STORM

- Collaborate with members and industry to ensure region is equipped to manage future crises effectively
- Comply with FERC and NERC inquiries
- Document lessons learned
- Review processes for improvement areas and implement recommendations

QUESTIONS

